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This article analyses the origins, development and organisation of cross-union, company-based 
trade union networks in transnational corporations in the metal and chemical industries in Brazil. 
Collectively developed by local, national, foreign and international trade union organisations, this 
kind of union action was introduced in the country in the early 2000s as a way to connect local 
labour representatives organising workers in different locations within the same company. 
Networks strengthen local labour power and stimulate transnational connections. Promoting 
solidarity among workers across multiple factories, they offer the perspective for a global 
unionism connected to shop-floor organisation. Despite these achievements, networks face 
important challenges. Power imbalances, the reliance on restrictive social dialogue arrangements 
and the compromise with traditional structures limit the reach of the strategy. 
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Against the backdrop of globalisation, there has been renewed interest in labour internationalism 
among scholars and workers’ organisations alike. Within the traditional international union 
structures, the adoption of a broader agenda suggested the possibility of new alliances (O’Brien, 
2000). At the same time, innovative forms of transnational organisation were conceived to take 
advantage of political opportunities and communications technologies in order to supersede a 
customary “diplomat model of trade union internationalism” (Hyman, 2005). In this regard, new 
union strategies in transnational corporations (TNCs) have been particularly significant (Bourque 
and Hennebert, 2011).  
As noted by Evans (2010: 352), global corporations “give far-flung workers common targets” 
and, moreover, their “corporate organisational structures provide road maps for the spread of 
global campaigns”. Along these lines, Wills (1998: 127) notes that the creation of cross-border 
union alliances in TNCs suggest that “the role of the international trade union movement may be 
refigured away from vertical representation toward the coordination and management of a 
network of trade unionists stretching across the global economy”. Indeed, transnational networks 
of union representatives working within the same company in different locations have provided 
many of the examples associated with the emergence of “a non-hierarchical form of 
internationalism, organizing locally and connecting place to place globally” (Webster, Lambert 
and Bezuidenhout, 2008: 208). 
Important studies on the subject have focused on efforts led by Global Union Federations 
 
Global Labour Journal, 2019, 10(3), Page 193 
 
(GUFs), international bodies dedicated to specific industries or professions. According to 
McCallum (2013: 5), “nearly all instances of labour transnationalism emerge from within 
individual GUFs”. The most notable outcome has been the signing of numerous Global 
Framework Agreements (GFAs), documents which, in spite of their unreliable enforceability, 
imply the recognition of a global mandate attributed to GUFs. Moreover, these agreements have 
been linked to the creation of new organisational forms aimed at developing a “global unionism” 
connected to proper industrial campaigns in the workplaces. In that manner, Fairbrother and 
Hammer (2005: 422) argue that “what is novel is the ways in which framework agreements, the 
negotiations that lead up to them and associated campaigns are rooted in the day-to-day realities 
of members and not the musings of remote international leaders”.  
Emphasising the multiscalar nature of contemporary union strategies, Ford and Gillan (2015: 
458) note that GUFs “are distinct from national and local unions in that they have an identifiable 
mandate to think, act and represent workers on a transnational basis”, but acknowledge that “the 
locus of union resources, authority structures and mobilisation remains local and national”. 
Likewise, Garver et al. (2007: 239) reason that, despite their efforts to establish a proper global 
mandate, “GUFs, which have affiliated unions rather than direct members, must rely on those 
affiliates for democratic legitimization and for organising local actions”. The consequence is that 
global union initiatives are in practice carried out cooperatively by organisations with different 
priorities, powers and prerogatives. 
In view of that, recent studies have emphasised the persistence of national concerns and 
regional imbalances amid the constitution of transnational union alliances. Cotton and Gumbrell-
McCormick (2012: 716) argue that the prevalence of regional or bi-national contours in many 
such initiatives may leave “power dynamics between trade unions from the global North and 
South intact, subordinating international priorities to the interests of the key players”. Regarding 
the manufacturing sector, in particular the motor industry, Anner et al. (2006: 22) contend that 
“national interests matter a great deal” and that domestic peculiarities motivated the leadership 
role assumed by German unions and produced relative disinterest in countries such as the United 
States. Furthermore, strict reliance on European conceptions of social dialogue and partnership 
has been identified as an obstacle to the efficacy of GFAs and associated strategies in a broader 
sense (Fichter and McCallum, 2015). Overall, these findings indicate that the challenges and 




The Present Research 
Considering the previous remarks, the question of whether and in which ways global strategies 
can be connected to the regular activities of local unions in different contexts is noteworthy. 
Moreover, it is important to understand how unions that are under-resourced, separated from 
TNCs’ headquarters and far away from the traditional backbone of international unionism may 
influence and take advantage of policies initially fostered in foreign settings. In order to explore 
these questions, in this article we analyse the undertakings of company-based, cross-union 
networks in the chemical and metal industries in Brazil. Conceived as part of a larger drive to 
build global union alliances in TNCs and simultaneously to deal with local challenges, these 
networks have been supported by international, foreign and domestic organisations. 
Accordingly, we adopted a framework aimed at establishing the multiscalar entanglements at 
play. At the international level, we interviewed Brazilian and foreign leaders of IndustriALL 
Global Union, the largest GUF and responsible for most manufacturing sectors. Additionally, we 
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contacted representatives from the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and the 
Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (TUCA). Foreign national organisations are 
represented by the Dutch Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV), the German Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) and its associated unions IG Metall and IG BCE, alongside solidarity 
foundations Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Solidarity Center of the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). Within domestic entities, we studied 
the role of the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), Força Sindical (FS) and their national 
confederations in the metal and chemical industries. Finally, research institutes such as the Social 
Observatory Institute (IOS) and the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-Economic 
Studies (DIEESE) are relevant in providing networks with research and information. 
The role of organisations conceiving and supporting networks from above is important, but 
our main goal is to bring to the forefront the impact of situations which are often less visible – 
those involving local representatives concerned with everyday struggles in the factories. In this 
manner, the second part of our research focused on local union officials organising in specific 
companies. Preliminary attempts at mapping networks revealed that their status and composition 
can change rather quickly. We thus decided that a thorough account of the tensions and 
prospects manifested in the process of building networks should prevail over a static evaluation 
of the existing structures at a specific point in time. To that end, we selected a sample of 
networks in different stages of development, which allowed us to explore examples of success as 
well as those of networks facing greater difficulties in different settings. Further on, we present 
an overview of the latest available data on currently active networks, but for the main body of the 
research we analysed fifteen networks in German (7), American (3), Brazilian (2), Dutch (1), 
French (1) and Belgian (1) TNCs. On this front, we conducted interviews with local leaders and 
workplace representatives associated with different metal and chemical unions in the states of São 
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco. 
For the most part, the research was carried out from 2014 to 2017. Additional fieldwork 
conducted in the two subsequent years was used in a complementary manner and to shine light 
on recent events. During the main stage of the research, forty-one trade unionists were subjected 
to in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Furthermore, our immersion in the field placed us in 
contact with many others. We have observed several events arranged to organise and discuss 
union networks in TNCs, which included union seminars, congresses and meetings at the 
national and international levels, but also smaller, regular activities of local union representatives 
engaged in specific networks. Finally, we took advantage of documentary research on the subject. 
In this regard, bulletins distributed to workers in the factories and internal reports on network 
activities were particularly useful. 
 
 
International Union Cooperation in TNCs in Brazil 
Instances of international cooperation in foreign corporations in Brazil are reported as early as 
the 1970s, when local unions took advantage of connections established within multinationals to 
mobilise foreign solidarity against human rights violations and anti-labour practices under the 
military dictatorship. These contacts continued to be developed over the years. Notably, an 
enduring cooperation between metalworkers associated with the CUT in Greater São Paulo’s 
ABC manufacturing cluster and their German counterparts in major automakers was important 
to the development of an internationalist approach to organising in TNCs in the country (Anner, 
2003). This “internationalism à la São Bernardo” (Oliveira, 2006) was influential on domestic 
perceptions of the international union movement, but the dissemination of the strategy was 
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limited by the fragmented nature of domestic union representation. Not surprisingly, it was 
concomitant with campaigns for a national metalworkers’ contract, a demand that is yet to be 
fulfilled. 
In Brazil, a single state-recognised autonomous union is responsible for every worker in 
specific industries inside a delimited territorial basis as narrow as a single municipality.1 
Additionally, up until very recently local unions were entitled to compulsory contributions 
informally known as the “union tax”.2 The consequence is the existence of a multitude of small 
unions led by officials strongly attached to their local powers and prerogatives, not least because 
they manage a stable source of income that is not dependent on the voluntary association of 
workers.3 All told, unions willing and capable of reaching out to foreign allies were an exception, 
not the rule. 
The limitations of local unionism were increasingly manifest from the late 1990s, when 
important foreign manufacturers established subsidiaries in greenfield sites in the country (Abreu, 
Beynon and Ramalho, 2000). At the same time, intensified global competition was disturbing 
long-established local arrangements. In the words of a workplace representative in a traditional 
auto parts factory in operation since the 1960s, “Today, ‘we’ are our biggest competitor. We are 
up against ‘ourselves’ in the United States, China or India. Within Brazil, someone takes our 
production to Minas Gerais. What can you do?” (Interview R1, September 2018). The usual local 
scope was no longer sufficient. According to a workplace representative in another company, 
reaching beyond the local meant “a huge change of culture, especially for Brazilian unionists, 
accustomed to a narrow horizon”. He added, however, that it was a “matter of survival” 
(Interview R2, July 2014). 
Demands for the overhaul of legal restrictions on union organisation have been continuously 
affirmed at the national level, but the decades-old legislation supporting the autonomy of local 
unions has proved remarkably resilient. Under these circumstances, new ideas on cross-border 
alliances in TNCs proposed by GUFs around the turn of the century offered an appealing 
alternative to challenge the isolation of local union representatives, both inside the country and at 
the transnational level. CUT, which had established an early engagement with the reorganisation 
of the international union movement, was well positioned to spearhead the introduction of global 
union strategies in Brazil (Costa, 2009).  
The decisive step was the creation of the “Action on Multinationals Project”, commonly 
known as “CUT-Multi”, an initiative developed by CUT’s International Relations Secretariat in 
cooperation with Dutch union federation FNV. The project proposed that unions affiliated to 
CUT should be “part of the forefront of international action along with global unions against the 
nefarious actions of multinationals” and stressed the need to involve “local unions from the 
workplace, with direct participation of local representatives” (CUT, 2006: 65). The project 
introduced new strategies to unionists in different industries, strategies such as GFAs and 
company networks. Furthermore, a model of organisation aimed at creating national alliances in 
Brazil was developed, and several initiatives that were eventually meant to be incorporated in 
global networks organised by GUFs were created. 
A few years later, CUT acknowledged the project’s “strategic importance” and established 
 
1 A detailed analysis of the influence of corporatist laws on Brazilian trade unions is provided by Lang and 
Gagnon (2009). 
2 The union tax was abolished in 2016. We return to this point in the concluding remarks. 
3 Campos (2016) found 10 817 unions in Brazil, and showed that 80.4 per cent of those covered only one 
or a few municipalities. 
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company networks as “instruments of workplace organisation for the central as a whole” (CUT, 
2006: 65). Moreover, networks have been able to expand their influence beyond CUT, reaching 
unions linked to different political tendencies. This was facilitated by the mitigation of domestic 
union rivalries after the Workers’ Party took office in 2003 and by the fact that IndustriALL has 
attracted new Brazilian affiliates, lending its global legitimacy to the strategy. Nevertheless, much 
of the appeal of company union networks resulted from their own achievements. As an FS leader 
acknowledged, CUT’s successes in this arena made them realise they were being “left behind” 
(Interview R3, August 2014). Today, networks are well-known among unions in the country, 
notably in the metal and chemical industries.4 
 
 
Building Union Networks 
Given the concentration of union powers at the local level in Brazil, the participation of local 
union officials and workplace representatives is vital to the success of company networks. A 
CUT-Multi specialist argued that “local unions are decisive, irreplaceable. If they say they won’t 
join, the network doesn’t happen” (Interview R4, August 2014). On the other hand, local unions 
do not build networks on their own. In the words of a workplace representative at a German 
automobile manufacturer, “You’re consumed by daily issues, by the problems in each factory. 
You get so involved you don’t even remember there are other factories [in Brazil], let alone other 
countries in the world” (Interview R5, November 2014). Accordingly, the first steps to build a 
network are usually taken by international, foreign or national domestic organisations. Table 1 
does not exhaust all of the declared motivations to build networks, but it offers a useful summary 
of the main resources and expectations involved in this process. 
 
 
Table 1: Profiles of union leaders associated with company-based union networks 






Global networks and 
agreements; research, training 
and education; global mandate 
and legitimacy 





Unionists in TNCs’ 
countries of origin 
Financial resources; access to 
global decision-makers in 
TNCs 




Union centrals and 
industrial confederations in 
Brazil 
Direct contact with local 








Local union officials and 
workplace representatives 
Shop-floor organisation; legal 
monopoly on trade union 
prerogatives 




4 The studied networks are explicitly supported by CUT and FS. Local unions affiliated to the União Geral 
dos Trabalhadores (UGT), Central dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras do Brasil (CTB), Conlutas and 
Intersindical, alongside unaffiliated unions, were also part of at least one network on their own discretion. 
It is worth noting, however, that there are unions which are critical of company-based initiatives and do 
not take part in networks. 
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In brief, there are different priorities at play in the selection of target companies. 
IndustriALL favours promising global initiatives and foreign unions prioritise TNCs 
headquartered in their countries. Much like GUFs at the global level, national industrial 
confederations see in networks the opportunity to affirm new prerogatives in the absence of a 
formal representation mandate, so emerging Brazilian TNCs or companies widespread 
throughout the country are typical priorities. Customarily, a few companies are chosen through a 
compromise between the major actors involved. Once a sufficient number of organisations agree 
to target certain TNCs, funds are provided and a study is commissioned to analyse the 
companies’ operations and, crucially, to map the relevant local unions organising in different 
parts of the country.5 
As we have argued, networks have been able to gain wider national support, which makes 
direct opposition on political grounds less likely. However, there is no guarantee that local unions 
affiliated to sympathetic centrals will be receptive. A local leader at a German chemical company 
explained that attachment to local autonomy is “an instinct that is hard to change. The union is 
like a town hall; each town has its own” (Interview R6, November 2014). At first, networks may 
be perceived as an assault on local prerogatives. Furthermore, union presidents may be wary of 
exposing young workplace representatives to an environment outside of local oversight. 
Accordingly, an experienced IndustriALL leader warns that networks should not disturb local 
arrangements: 
 
When the person in the network feels more powerful than the local union president, and starts to 
push his own politics, that’s a mistake. The union will not accept that, because legally in the country 
the mandate belongs to the union. The network cannot become too independent from the union 
(Interview R7, August 2014). 
 
All things considered, at the national level company networks are alliances of local unions. 
The scope of a network depends on the target company. In theory, a network could be formed 
by representatives in a company with two factories in the country, but they usually involve 
multiple locations (see Figure 1). National meetings are held regularly, usually once a year. The 
participation of observers and lecturers from national organisations and IndustriALL is not 
uncommon. In these meetings, unions exchange information and decide on an action plan that 
will guide their actions until the next assembly. Usually, plans involve visits to present the 
initiative to potential new members, solidarity actions and coordinated campaigns. When there 
are global networks in place, one or a few members are chosen to participate in international 
activities. Voting is rare and decisions are almost always consensual. In between regular meetings, 
members of a network establish regular communications using the Internet, instant messaging 
and other technologies. 
 
 
Local Roots and the Bread and Butter of Trade Unionism 
The decision to prioritise the mitigation of tensions is not without consequences. Networks 
refrain from reaching out to workers directly, thus oppositional political minorities are excluded. 
Furthermore, networks avoid polarising subjects such as different conceptions of trade union 
practices. Global, foreign and national leaders often complain that networks are locked into the 
 
5 The cooperation between CUT and FNV created the Social Observatory Institute, which specialises in 
the production of studies on TNCs. 
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“small world of the local union”. Nevertheless, representatives engaged in networks are insistent 
upon the argument that they do not threaten established unions. According to a trade unionist in 
a German metal conglomerate, “We won’t do a thing without authorisation from the local union. 





Figure 1: A typical company union network in Brazil 
 
 
As ill-equipped as they might be to carry out such initiatives on their own, local unions 
exercise an informal power of veto and, in this way, they are able to shape networks to a 
considerable extent. In this manner, a method of consensus and compromise is well-suited to 
creating a shared platform around the issues that most concern local representatives in the 
factories. “We work with what is possible, what unites us. What divides us, we won’t discuss”, 
explains a local unionist in a Dutch chemical corporation (Interview R9, October 2014). 
Common topics discussed within company networks are wages, benefits, safety, health and 
working conditions – that is, issues that emanate from local agendas. In the words of a national 
leader of CUT’s metalworkers: 
 
People expect something very intellectual, very bureaucratic. It is not like that! I like to talk about 
my father, who worked for Ford and Mercedes. In the seventies, workers showed one another their 
pay checks to know how much they earned. They exchanged information. This is what the strategy 
of the networks is all about today. Within the same company, first inside the country, to try to make 
wages and benefits the same for everyone (Interview R8, December 2014). 
 
Indeed, the simple exchange of information has immediate benefits. Provided with 
information from multiple sites, local representatives previously limited to the reality of a single 
factory are better equipped to challenge the positions of local bosses. As one unionist explained, 
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however, the decisive step forward is to “push a situation” to the company. This means building 
a united front to fight for a relationship between unions and companies beyond the local level 
(Interview R8, December 2014). In order for this approach to be effective, however, alliances 
cannot be restricted to union officials. The traditional practice in the metal and chemical 
industries in Brazil is for decisions regarding specific companies to be made in open assemblies at 
the gates of the factories and, in this way, workers must be convinced that a coalition with their 
faraway colleagues is desirable.  
In a typical case, IndustriALL decided to campaign for a global agreement with a French 
chemical company we will call “Group X”. Brazilian representatives were very receptive and, 
after a first meeting formalised a national network, unions decided to publish a joint version of 
their usual means of communication – a bulletin to be distributed in the factories. Signed by five 
different local unions, CUT and IndustriALL, the pamphlet called: “To the struggle, working 
men and women of Group X! You have another tool to fight for your rights!” The document 
emphasised the need for workers to be “globally organised” and highlighted contacts established 
via teleconference with an American representative of the United Steelworkers, plans to build a 
global network and IndustriALL’s campaign for a GFA. At the national level, unions agreed on a 
platform that included the equalisation of wages and benefits across the factories. Directly 
engaging workers, the bulletin asked:  
 
Why are there different wages and benefits in different sites of the group? Would it not be fair to 
equalise the rights at least inside the country? In your workplace, are there the benefits described 
below? If not, what is the reason?”6 
 
In this sense, unions appeal to differences among workers performing the same job in 
different locations to promote solidarity against the “divide and conquer”, whipsawing strategy 
employed by TNCs. According to a leader in another network: 
 
Workers are used to seeing the union gathering people at the gate of the factory. It’s easy to 
position the sound truck and assemble workers for hours. You start to talk about things that are 
part of their lives; you explain what is happening there [in another factory]. You say that the 
problems over there can affect employment here. There’s no safety, their wages are lower, so their 
product is cheaper. If we don’t have solidarity with each other, this will affect both plants. But one 
can live with the other, without one being pitched against the other (Interview R8, December 
2014). 
 
Naturally, local concerns are not always easy to dismiss. That was the case of a network 
dealing with the threat of a factory being closed. After multiple attempts to make the site viable, 
it was decided that the only realistic solution was for a stronger factory to give up part of its 
production in favour of the struggling location. A workplace representative found himself in a 
tough spot when proposing the idea to his fellow workers being asked to make the sacrifice: 
  
It was a hard, difficult debate. To come out and say, ‘Look, this work you’re doing, we have to give 
it to them so they don’t lose their jobs’. Workers looked back at me and said, ‘Gee, you’re taking 
away my work, it will be my job on the line in a few days!’ (Interview R5, November 2014). 
 
In spite of their fears, a majority of workers voted for the network’s proposal and the jobs 
 
6 First bulletin of a trade union network in a French chemical company in Brazil, 2013. The bulletin is 
available in the local union archives. 
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were saved. There are similar reports of solidarity in different companies. This is evidence that 
local priorities are relevant, but not insurmountable. Given enough time to overcome initial 
doubts and develop mutual trust, unions can combine their local roots to promote concerted 
strategies. Moreover, solidarity based on principles of justice and equality and the conviction that 
workers should stand united when dealing with bosses are a central part of the strategy. In this 
sense, the studied cases suggest that company alliances may in fact be used to connect global 
policies to local struggles.  
 
 
Transnational Connections and European Aspirations 
Domestic networks are invariably connected to IndustriALL, but the description presented so far 
is largely based on the experiences of local unions organising within Brazil. In practice, the 
degrees to which the activities of particular networks are transnationalised vary considerably. 
Whenever funding is available, local unions are glad to take part in international activities and, in 
this sense, the official position is that national alliances are steps towards the realisation of global 
networks. However, as noted by Croucher and Cotton (2009: 76), “staggeringly, given their 
strategic importance and the substantial GUF resources dedicated to them, there are no examples 
of truly global company networks”. Overall, international activities tend to be few and far 
between. Their existence depends on the funds available to GUFs or provided by unions in 
companies’ home countries, which means that foreign priorities beyond the grasp of local unions 
are often determinant. Nevertheless, more informal international contacts can be important to 
support local networks. 
From the perspective of local representatives, the most valued foreign allies are precisely the 
unions in direct contact with companies’ headquarters. Taking advantage of these connections, 
local representatives can outflank factory bosses and challenge the despotism that results from 
the insularity of local authority. A local unionist argued that after these connections were in place, 
bosses realised that union officials could “deal with it upstairs”, so their demands started to be 
taken seriously (Interview R10, October 2014). Although in theory this dynamic could be 
replicated in any TNC as long as the relevant unions are involved, in practice positive outcomes 
are more likely in cases where home-country unions are able to influence global executives, 
notably in companies which have a tradition of dialogue with union representatives. 
The prevalence of European approaches to global union strategies in the manufacturing 
industries reinforces these features, as social dialogue and partnership arrangements support 
many such initiatives. This is noticeable in the composition of Global Framework Agreements. 
IndustriALL has signed forty-five GFAs but only four with companies headquartered outside of 
the European Union. In view of that, Fichter and McCallum (2015: 81) argue that in order to 
have “any real meaning”, GFAs “must be relevant to all potential and existing actors, global and 
local” and that “it is imperative that actors beyond those in the limited social partnership setting 
are involved”. The question, then, is whether the method favoured by influential foreign unions 
is appealing in Brazil. 
In view of our cases, at first glance the answer would be affirmative. Cooperation with 
European unions is influential regardless of target companies’ countries of origin. The few 
instances where representatives from Brazil were included in transnational co-partnership 
arrangements in German companies are well-regarded and contacts with European Works 
Councils (EWCs) set farfetched but highly prized goals. Furthermore, these dispositions were 
part of broader changes in union practices in the country from the 1990s, when CUT 
“increasingly aligned itself with union experiments based on European social democratic 
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unionism” (Antunes and Santana, 2014: 17). 
The relevance of such affinities notwithstanding, one should not take the argument too far. 
Given that interactions between unionists and managers at the local level in Brazil tend to be 
hostile, advances in social dialogue practices were always the result of determined struggles, the 
outcomes of which never quite match the stability perceived in European practices and 
legislation. Overall, the use local unions make of social dialogue discourses is pragmatic rather 
than ideological. Although speaking the language of foreign commitments and corporate social 
responsibility favoured by companies may be useful, local unions do not abandon their traditional 
methods and conflict remains part of the equation: 
 
I always tell my people that there’s a proverb that says that peace is made from strength. We can 
have all this talk about social dialogue, Global Framework Agreements, but if workers are not 
strong in the rank-and-file, after the first crisis it’s all gone. ... Networks are able to promote this 
idea of social dialogue, which companies like. We have to take advantage of that and use their 
contradictions against them. So we talk, but without ever giving up our greatest tools: speaking to 
workers and the strike (Interview R8, December 2014). 
 
Accordingly, the history of company networks in Brazil is marked by episodes of disruption 
and local unions are seldom naïve about the possibility of a direct incorporation of foreign 
arrangements. A local official in a German chemical company warned that “social dialogue is 
good, but also dangerous”. He argued that “one should not lose sight of [the contradictions in] 
the relationship between capital and labour; otherwise you fall into a trap and sometimes there’s 
no way out” (Interview R11, September 2014). 
The caution with imported practices is best illustrated by local attitudes regarding Global 
Framework Agreements. Leaders in Brazil often argue that such agreements contain provisions 
that are too abstract to be used effectively, and criticise them for being disconnected from local 
struggles. A recurring joke among local unionists is that GFAs are not the result of workers’ 
struggles, but rather casually signed when a foreign union president happens to have dinner with 
the Chief Executive Officer of a global corporation in Europe. Others demand greater 
participation in the negotiation of future agreements. These positions notwithstanding, the 
prevailing feeling among local representatives is more about indifference than outright opposition 
or engagement. GFAs are reduced to one more tool in a wider set of principles and documents 
that can be used to legitimise workers’ demands within TNCs, such as codes of conduct and 
international conventions.  
In effect, local unions prefer to voice their concerns directly. Regarding cross-border 
negotiations with TNCs, a typical strategy has been the pursuit of “social dialogue rounds” as 
institutionalised bargaining spaces between unions and managers at the national level. Unlike the 
processes that produce GFAs, these are held periodically, involve local representatives directly 
and deal with concrete issues. In a few cases, Brazilian networks have taken the initiative to reach 
out to unions in neighbouring countries to create networks at the regional level, which resulted in 
the expansion of such bargaining spaces.  
In one of these instances, almost twenty Brazilian and Argentinian unionists sat with 
corporate executives of a Dutch chemical company in 2013. In their speeches, workers’ 
representatives mobilised United Nations and International Labour Organization conventions, 
the legitimacy of IndustriALL and the support of Dutch unions to demand a “social dialogue in 
the workplace”, by which they meant the presence union representatives in the factories. 
Corporate executives were reticent about providing a definitive answer and emphasised the 
unenforceable nature of the dialogue. Unions were not satisfied and established a deadline, 
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announcing that “if a response is not possible, the Network will seek other measures to ensure 
that its demands are met”7. In this manner, local unions use outside opportunities selectively, 
favouring strategies which can more readily be connected to their established practices.  
In sum, networks allow unions to combine local power with foreign support to fight for the 
material improvement of the conditions of workers in the company and, when they are 
sufficiently strong, for greater union influence across different scales. The most common tangible 
achievements are the equalisation of working conditions and parts of the remuneration between 
factories, particularly complements to wages such as profit-sharing and benefits, and the 
strengthening of union representatives in different scopes, from the recognition of workplace 
representatives to national and international spaces of influence and negotiation. 
 
 
Limited Resources and the Path of Least Resistance 
Although networks translate foreign ideas into local terms, it should be noted that most positive 
cases exist under conditions that are not easily replicated. In this way, networks are limited to 
relatively few companies. Our last survey, conducted in 2019, identified twenty-four active 
networks operating in the metal and chemical industries in Brazil. Their target companies are 
headquartered in Germany (8), Brazil (6), non-German Europe (5), the United States (4) and Asia 
(1). Compared to GFAs, networks in Brazil are more diverse, but European and German TNCs 
are still over-represented. This is a consequence of foreign national priorities, but also of the fact 
that, being under-resourced, promoters of networks prefer to prioritise companies in which they 
perceive a greater chance of success. The hope is that positive cases will encourage local unions 
to take on the challenge of building networks on their own. 
There is evidence that this approach has been at least partially effective. Well-known cases of 
success are often mentioned as inspiration by local representatives working in different settings. 
However, there is the risk that social dialogue will be assumed to be the goal to be pursued 
regardless of other considerations. The outcome of the efforts mentioned in a previous section to 
create a network in “Group X” indicates that stern opposition from managers can trap young 
networks in a stalemate. In this case, relations between the company and local unions were very 
hostile, and included the use of police to suppress strikes. According to a local official, unions 
were “very enthusiastic” about the network, but after bosses ignored their attempt at a dialogue 
they were left with a feeling of frustration. In his words, “We gave the company a chance, but it’s 
no use. Here, things only change with a strike. There's no other way” (Interview R12, October 
2014). Could the network, however, be useful if it worked alongside the usual tactics? 
 
Of course, if the network was functioning…. If we could strike here and in other factories at the 
same time. If we stop and they keep working, it’s no good. The production can be transferred, 
that’s no problem. They can do it in Mexico, in Chile. If we were organised at least here in Latin 
America, in the United States…. Yes, then it would be good. The dream is good. Nobody takes the 
dream away from us. The dream is great (Interview R12, October 2014). 
 
The problem, then, is not that networks can only be conceived within the confines of social 
dialogue, but that following a different path is difficult. Funded by organisations invested in 
national priorities or seeking the path of least resistance, networks facing hostile settings may be 
abandoned before they have a chance to mature. This is a limitation that cannot be overcome 
 
7 Report on the “Regional Social Dialogue” in a Dutch chemical corporation. Source: local union archives. 
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without a decision to dedicate greater resources to such initiatives. From the perspective of local 
unions, this is seldom realistic. Responsible for organising in several different companies in their 
territories, investing too much in organising a single corporation is often out of the question. As a 
workplace representative in a German chemical company reflected, “there are two hundred 
companies under our union; how can we spend so much money on a single one?” (Interview 
R13, October 2014).  
The official solution has been to pursue corporate funding, which creates additional 
problems. In one instance, local representatives in a German car parts maker admitted to 
omitting offering this arrangement to workers, arguing that while in Germany this kind of 
relationship is accepted, “in Brazil we’re not at this point” (Interview R14, October 2014). 
Another local leader, whose network was not yet funded by the company, stated he “didn’t want 
to think about it” and joked that, for the time being, he could “still sleep in peace” (Interview 
R15, November 2014). Yet another unionist argued that he felt “completely trapped in the 
financial relationship with the company” and maintained that “independence would grant a much 
greater benefit” (Interview R8, December 2014). Although our research did not find evidence of 
direct corporate co-optation of networks, there is no doubt that companies use this situation to 
their advantage, limiting the scope of what can be negotiated and refusing to fund activities that 
include unwanted third parties. 
 
 
Persisting Structures and Restricted Membership 
A patent shortcoming of the studied networks is that although they connect unions across 
borders, they do not expand their member base (see Figure 2). These are alliances of unions of 
metal and chemical workers and, consequently, their strategies are based on the experiences of 
their members: traditional manufacturing workers, mostly males directly employed in production. 
In this sense, the very idea of network organisation can be misleading. While this concept is often 
associated with a democratic approach opposed to old bureaucratic hierarchies, in this case the 
idea is used to introduce networks as a novelty that will not disturb established structures. 
According to a specialist, “this theoretical shift is important: the change from a global federation 
or committee to a network. Those are rigid structures that represent power, and that could be a 
threat to the already existing power of local unions” (Interview R4, August 2014). To put it 
simply, networks amend rather than overcome the established union structures and, in this way, 
they incorporate many of its limitations. 
For instance, a local unionist in a German chemical company acknowledged that it would be 
beneficial to include white-collar workers, who are severely underrepresented in networks. He 
argued that they could provide “very important information about profits, investments, where 
the technology is going”. However, he claimed that consistent cooperation is difficult because 
“there’s still a lot of prejudice between administrative workers and shop-floor, blue-collar 
workers” (Interview R6, November 2014). In a wider sense, including new leaders would create 
tensions and disrupt customary practices. As long as unions do not bridge the gap between these 
workers at the local level, networks will inherit these divisions. 
Likewise, networks fail to organise contract and outsourced workers. This is important 
because directly employed workers may be subjected to conditions of exploitation and injustice, 
but, as a metalworker unionist from São Bernardo defined, “the barbarism is in the production 
chain” (Interview R2, July 2014). Stronger union presence on the shop floor often results in 
solidarity with contract workers, who in this sense indirectly benefit from networks; however, the 
efficacy of this kind of informal support is severely limited by restrictions imposed by national 
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labour legislation. Moreover, institutionalising informal representation of contract workers at the 
company level is difficult because TNCs refuse to recognise them as part of social dialogue 
arrangements. 
Furthermore, activists protesting the negative impacts of TNCs on communities and the 
environment are not represented. According to a former unionist who worked on the early CUT-
Multi project, the possibility for the participation of these groups was well-received when 
networks were initially proposed. After what he considered a “very sad meeting”, however, the 
idea was shut down because some of the involved unions foresaw conflicts between their agenda 
and the defending of jobs and production (Interview R16, August 2014). Again, the sort of 
dialogue networks prioritise is ill-suited to dealing with an expansive agenda. Although unions 









In the introduction, we contrasted theoretical insights on new forms of labour transnationalism 
and the sobering conclusions of studies which emphasise the persistence of national concerns, 
power imbalances and traditional structures. Our findings reflect these conflicting trends. On the 
one hand, company networks combine local power and global opportunities, making 
internationalism relevant to workers in the factories. On the other, they exclude relevant parts of 
the workforce and do not always succeed in different settings. The crux of the matter is that 
these limitations are not the result of a single factor. As we have argued, divisions may be 
reinforced by corporate influence and foreign priorities, but they are also deeply entrenched in 
local structures. In effect, the studied cases are supported by a precarious compromise made 
possible by the partial alignment of different sets of interests: the willingness of certain 
companies to establish a dialogue with a segment of the workforce, the concerns of foreign 
unions and domestic organisations at the national level and, last but not least, the priorities of 
local unions operating within the limits of restrictive legislation. In this sense, networks are 
shaped by material, political and structural constraints that are intertwined and manifested in 
uneven relations established between workers and TNCs, between different union organisations, 
and between unions and the state.  
However, although the existing situation favours the prevalence of certain practices, it does 
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not suppress underlying tensions and contested relations. Accordingly, the current status is 
maintained only as far as alternatives are blocked by contingent compromises. Our main 
argument, in this sense, is that company networks in Brazil were not a passive outcome of 
foreign ideas and external priorities. We have emphasised the role of local unions, but one should 
not overlook that broader domestic concerns were also crucial. The studied cases would not have 
been possible without CUT’s determination to play an internationally active role and, at the 
national level, in the absence of its perceptions on the flaws of union localism. Therefore, the 
imbalances between domestic and foreign unions and the limitations of local unionism are 
constraints, but they were also issues targeted by the incorporation of global union strategies in 
Brazil. 
Many of the hopes inspired by these endeavours seem to have been dashed on the rocks of 
the political and economic turmoil that has swept the country in the last few years. Support for 
the Workers’ Party was split in 2014 and union rivalries were rekindled during the fall of Dilma 
Rousseff’s government in 2016. Affiliations to IndustriALL have not been impacted so far and 
networks are relatively shielded from political disturbances, but the ensuing strife reverberated in 
other international bodies.8 On the other hand, opposition to anti-labour policies and attacks on 
unions by subsequent presidents suggest the possibility of renewed alliances. Overall, 
international solidarity of a more political character is expected to assume greater importance, but 
the future of labour internationalism in Brazil is largely uncertain. 
In regard to networks in particular, the most relevant developments have been the end of the 
“union tax” in 2017 and additional restrictions placed on optional contributions in 2019. The 
immediate consequence was the financial debilitation of union organisations. The other side of 
the coin is that the foundations which traditionally supported the resilience of local unionism 
have been fractured. As a result, even the hermetic space of company networks is being tested. In 
early 2019, during the most recent meeting of a network we have observed, the intrusion of ideas 
such as the formation of national unions was inevitable.  
In 2014, a Brazilian global unionist argued that a “political understanding that the global is 
important” should be connected to an “openness to work in paralegal arrangements” – that is, a 
willingness to challenge established practices. He lamented, however, that unionists in Brazil were 
still “trapped in the legal structure” (Interview R7, August 2014). These matters will not be 
decided within the confines of company networks, but the need to reinvent the local union 
movement may now lend credibility to alternatives which a few years ago would have been 
considered unrealistic. In this sense, it is not insignificant that different dispositions endure 
behind the current shortcomings. This is better illustrated by the statement of a local unionist 
which, expressing aspirations rather than the effective state of his network, offered another 
perspective on our subject: 
 
The network has a greater role than debating the day-to-day, if the food is good, if wage increases 
were good. The network should talk about sustainable development, the question of the 
environment, the relationship between capital and labour in a wider sense to preserve workers’ 
rights and human dignity. This macro discussion, when you unite a lot of people around it, you get 
much stronger. That was the idea when we created the network. We still have a long way ahead of 




8 Força Sindical left TUCA and formed the Alternativa Democratica Sindical as a rival Latin American 
international federation in 2017. 
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R1 – Workplace representative, German metal conglomerate A, interviewed September 2018. 
R2 – Metalworker unionist and former workplace representative in German automobile manufacturer B, 
São Bernardo do Campo, interviewed July 2014. 
R3 – FS leader, interviewed August 2014. 
R4 – Staff member, CUT-Multi project, interviewed August 2014. 
R5 – Workplace representative in German automobile manufacturer B, interviewed November 2014. 
R6 – Local unionist, German chemical company C, interviewed November 2014. 
R7 – Brazilian IndustriALL leader, interviewed August 2014. 
R8 – Local unionist, German metal conglomerate A, interviewed December 2014. 
R9 – Local unionist, Dutch chemical corporation D, interviewed October 2014. 
R10 – Local unionist, Belgian chemical corporation E, interviewed October 2014. 
R11 – Local unionist, German chemical company F, interviewed September 2014. 
R12 – Local unionist, French glass manufacturer Group X, interviewed October 2014. 
R13 – Workplace representative, German chemical company G, interviewed October 2014. 
R14 – Workplace representative, German car parts maker H, interviewed October 2014. 
R15 – Local unionist, American glass manufacturer I, interviewed November 2014. 
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